Special Conditions

In these illustrations of theoretical or reflective judgments it will be observed that no previous single experience was in the mind of the one forming the judgment but merely a generalization, an abstraction, or principle.

The experience that is really capitalized is the formation of the generalizations, abstractions, and principles which are thereafter available for reflective judgments and can be applied to a multitude of novel situations but situations in which the generalization, abstraction, or principle is a factor.

The significance of reflective judgments in increasing human efficiency was manifested in a striking manner by the following experiment. A group of individuals were tested as to their ability to solve a number of mechanical puzzles. The time required for each individual was recorded. The subjects then described as completely as possible how they had solved the problem (worked the puzzle). In some instances the subjects kept trying blindly, till by accident they hit upon the right method. In such cases the second and third trials might take as long or even longer than the first trial. If, however, the subject had in mind the right principle or principles for solving the problems, the time required for succeeding attempts fell abruptly. Curve A of Figure 6 is a graphic representation of the results of A with one of the puzzles. To solve the problem the first time required 1476 seconds. While solving it this first time A discovered a principle upon which success depended. The second attempt consumed 241 seconds. While solving the problem this second time he discovered a second principle. With these two principles in mind succeeding attempts were rendered rapid and certain.

Another young man, B, in solving his problem. (Chinese Rings Puzzle) succeeded after working 1678 seconds. At the completion of this successful attempt he had in mind no principle for working it. The second trial was not so successful as the first and lasted 2670 seconds. With succeeding trials he reduced his time but not regularly and was still working ``in the dark.'' His method was one of extreme simplicity and probably not different from the ``try, try again'' method employed by animals in learning. The results of his first ten trials are graphically shown in Curve B of Figure 6.

A comparison of Figure 6 with the five {illust. caption = FIG. 6.} figures of Chapter X will show how rapidly increase of efficiency is when dependent upon judgments as contrasted with improvement dependent upon habit.

A judgment once having been made may be utilized again and again. The process of applying these preformed judgments is known as an intuitive or perhaps better called an expert judgment.

Expert judgments

Just as appropriate concrete experiences determine the nature and the range of practical judgments, and as the formation of generalizations, abstractions, and principles determine the possibilities of reflective judgments, so the actual formation of the practical and reflective judgments determine the nature and the range of the intuitive or expert judgments.

Some years ago I had a need for an attorney to perform for me a petty service. Just at that critical moment I met a friend who was a lawyer. I employed him forthwith. At a later time I needed a lawyer again, recalled my former experience, and called up the same attorney. This employing him the second time was clearly a practical judgment. If I have frequent need for an attorney, I shall probably make use of my preformed practical judgment and employ this same attorney. This act will never become a habit, but it will approximate more and more a habitual action, and will seem to be performed intuitively, and will be an illustration of an expert judgment.

This morning I was asked to find a cook and man of general utility for an outing camp. I had no preformed practical judgment which I could apply to the case and did not even possess a remembrance of any experience upon which I might base a practical experience. In such a case therefore I am not only not an expert but I do not possess the necessary preliminary experiences for developing such ability.

During the last decade I have given much thought to this question: Does the efficiency of one's thinking depend at all upon the clearness and distinctness of the mental image used in the thinking? I settled the question in the negative. The formation of this principle (clear thinking does not depend upon clear visual image) was an act of reflective judgment. But now the application of this preformed judgment has developed into an expert judgment. Recently I was given the manuscript of a course in psychology and asked to appraise it. One of the chief points of the author was to advise all business men to develop clear visual images. In fact he asserted that clearness of thinking was in proportion to clearness of the visual image with which the thinking is carried on. Without again weighing the evidence for my principle, I applied my preformed judgment and by means of this expert judgment condemned the course.

A man is expert only in those fields in which he has developed the appropriate habits, the necessary, practical, and reflective judgments, and has had some practice in applying these judgments.

We find that four classes of experiences are valuable, i.e. such experiences as result in the formation of habits; such as result in practical judgments, in reflective judgments, and in expert judgments. Our final task is to consider methods for increasing the probabilities that such experiences may be secured and utilized.

SECURING AND UTILIZING THESE MOST VALUABLE EXPERIENCES

The conditions best adapted for procuring and utilizing one class of these most valuable experiences may not be the best for the other three classes. Our final problem must therefore be subdivided into four parts corresponding to the four classes of valuable experience.

Special Conditions Favorable to Habit Formation

The essential condition for habit formation is repetition with intensity of application. The modern movement in the industrial world known as scientific management supplies this need for repetition by standardizing all activities so that they will be repeated over and over in identical form; and it secures the intensity of application by means of the task and bonus system. By these means the most valuable experiences for habit formation are secured and utilized.

The working out of this fact is so admirably described in recent reports upon scientific management that further description here would be superfluous.